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Abstract: The simulations that many defense analysts rely upon in their studies continue to
grow in size and complexity. This paper contrasts the guidance that the authors have received—
from some of the giants of military operations research—with the current practice. In particular,
the analytic utility of Hughes’ simple salvo equations is compared with that of the complex Joint
Warfighting System (JWARS), with respect to JWARS’ key performance parameters. The
comparison suggests that a family of analytic tools supports the best analyses. It follows that
smaller, more agile, and transparent models, such as Hughes’ salvo equations, are underutilized
in defense analyses. We believe that these models should receive more attention, use, and
funding. To illustrate this point, this paper uses two very simple models (by modern standards)
to rapidly generate insights on the value of information relative to force strength. © 2003 Wiley
Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 197–217, 2003.
Keywords: combat models; defense analysis; Hughes’ salvo equations; JWARS; simulation;
value of information
All models are wrong, but some are useful—George Box [7]
1. INTRODUCTION
According to Moore’s law, computational power doubles roughly every 18 months. It follows
that, in each decade, we have about two orders of magnitude more processing power at our
disposal. How should analysts utilize more computational power? When compared to a decade
ago, in a fixed amount of time, with a given model, we can look at a 100 times more cases. Or,
we can use this extra processing capability to look at a similar number of cases, but with an
increase in the resolution of the model. For example, we can have shorter time-steps, higher-
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resolution terrain, more-detailed motion, thinking, sensing, and attrition algorithms, etc. Given
these two options, it seems that most defense analysts, due to the complexity of the phenomenon
being modeled, tend to increase the detail in their models. As a result, the models that we use
to provide information to assist decision-makers are becoming increasingly complex. Our
contention is that for many decision-making problems, small, focused models, or sets of models,
can provide insights more effectively and efficiently.
The ever-increasing complexity of our models has made them extremely difficult to use.
Furthermore, the opacity of such complex models can hinder our ability to communicate the
results to decision-makers without an implicit, and often unwarranted, reliance on the veracity
of our models. Some even question our relevance (see [38]). Carl Builder [6] worries that
“[w]hat began as science unmasking the myths and choices in war has become, instead, mostly
the art of cloaking predilections in the language of science and the color of war.”
This paper reviews the guidance given by the giants in military operations research on how
best to assist decision-makers. This guidance is contrasted with what seems to be the usual
practice. To focus this contrast, we consider two models: the simple Hughes’ salvo equations
and the complex Joint Warfighting System (JWARS), which epitomizes the usual practice.
These models’ attributes are discussed with respect to their ability to help us underpin better
decisions. It is important to state up front that these are different models, with different goals.
Moreover, different tools apply to different situations. Therefore, this discussion should not be
seen as encompassing all models and all analyses. Rather, this paper emphasizes how simple
models can greatly enhance analyses, but they clearly cannot replace traditional large simula-
tions for all purposes.
The next section summarizes some of the wisdom of the more experienced and distinguished
analysts in our profession about how we can help people make better decisions. Section 3 gives
a brief introduction to Hughes’ salvo equations and JWARS. Section 4 illustrates how insightful
even very simple models can be. In this section, we use an extension to Hughes’ salvo equations
to rapidly generate insights on the potential value of information in surface combat. Section 5
compares and contrasts Hughes’ salvo equations and JWARS, with respect to JWARS’ key
performance parameters. In Section 6, we use just about the simplest model possible as the
foundation for human experiments on how effectively military officers use and perceive
information. Section 7 summarizes the key findings and suggests that synthesizing multiple tools
offers the possibility of enhancing our analyses.
2. WHAT THE GIANTS TELL US
This section links together several quotes from a variety of leading analysts about how we can
best use models to enhance the decision-making process. Let’s start at the very beginning. In the
first sentence of their seminal text, Morse and Kimball [35] define the field of study that grew
out of the efforts of Allied scientists during World War II as follows: “Operations Research is
a scientific method of providing [decision-makers] with a quantitative basis for [decision-
making].” Thus, we will focus on how we can quantitatively help people make better decisions.
Recently, Operations Research has been (and still is being) used to help make decisions related
to the following types of questions:
● How many B-2 bombers should we buy?
● What tradeoffs should the Navy make in upgrading the F-18E/F in terms of stealth,
weapons, sensors, cost, etc.?
● In Desert Storm, how should the attack proceed?
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● What mix of street-fighters and aircraft carriers should the Navy have in 2020?
● What range and lethality of a new Land Attack Missile (LAM) will allow the Navy
to effectively support the Marines’ vision of “Maneuver From the Sea?”
● How should the Army reorganize its heavy divisions, and what tactics should it use
with new information equipment?
The resultant decisions can involve many billions of dollars—and, more importantly, may
save or cost many lives. These decisions are very complex, with numerous factors and
uncertainties to consider. Furthermore, for many of them there is a dearth of operational data that
can be used. This complexity often leads decision-makers to turn to analysts for assistance, who,
in turn, often employ sophisticated models.
2.1. The Role of the Analyst
It’s the analyst not the model that produces important useful results—Seth Bonder [4]
To address many of the questions above, analysts frequently use models that simulate
potential future conflicts. For many-on-many combat models, several estimates must be gener-
ated to supply the enormous amount of data required to run the models. Uncertainties that
typically need to be supplied to the models include: the combatants, their goals, when and where
the conflict takes place, what equipment the sides have, how the equipment performs, and the
abilities and resiliency of the combatants. In fact, many of the dominant factors of combat (e.g.,
training, morale, unit cohesion) are notoriously difficult to model (see Brandstein [5]). Further-
more, due to changing conditions and a dearth of real-world data, many of our warfare models
have not been scientifically validated. More precisely, the situation being modeled (i.e., warfare)
is such that we cannot provide a warranty on the accuracy of our models’ predictions about
potential future conflicts (see [12] and [20]). In this environment, it does not seem reasonable
that models can provide reliable answers by themselves. So, Hamming’s [18] admonition that
“the purpose of computing is insight, not numbers,” is of particular importance in defense
analysis.
Retired Lieutenant General Glen Kent [31], who has been both a senior decision-maker and
a leading analyst, writes that the analyst’s role is “to provide illumination and visibility—to
expose some problem in terms that are as simple as possible. This is so obvious that it hardly
seems necessary to make the point.” Enthovan and Smith [16] add that “[a]nalysis is not to give
the answer, but to show how the answer depends on various assumptions and judgments.” So,
with all of our uncertainty and the difficulty in validating our models, the question remains: How
should analysts use models to effectively glean insights and communicate them to decision-
makers?
2.2. The Role of the Model
Models are for Thinking—Sir Maurice Kendall [30]
In recent years, large simulation models seem to dominate many analysis efforts. Of course,
model results, by themselves, are not analysis. Clayton Thomas emphasized to the authors that
“ms&a should always be thought of as ms&A” (personal communication). More specifically,
Wayne Hughes [22] states that two “primary benefits of model-based studies are to (1) help
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explore the issues in a structured way and organize a debate, and (2) uncover new insights and
reveal surprising characteristics.” If we want to follow these experienced analysts’ advice, the
question remains: What kind of model will best help us structure and organize debates,
efficiently uncover new insights, and effectively communicate our findings to decision-makers?
Just how much depth and breadth should be in our models?
2.3. How Big Should Our Models Be?
The goodness of a model is judged by how well it achieves its purpose—Wayne Hughes [22]
How big should our models be to help us facilitate debates, reveal insights, and communicate
findings? The answer is, of course, it depends. Nonetheless, Occum’s razor tells us that
“[m]ultiplicity ought not to be posited without necessity.” In another variant, Helmbold’s
hatchet [19] puts “the burden of proof on the party claiming that a factor must be introduced.”
The difficulty for defense analysts is that the number of factors that can potentially affect
outcomes and processes is enormous. A children’s poem illustrates the dilemma facing the
analyst:
For want of a nail the shoe was lost
For want of a shoe the horse was lost
For want of a horse the rider was lost
For want of a rider the message was lost
For want of a message the battle was lost
For want of a battle the kingdom was lost
And all for the want of a nail
Since they can be decisive, should we try to model, in excruciating detail, all of the nails, in
all of the horseshoes, on all of the horses, and all of the things in the environment that can affect
them? Can we ever get there, even with orders of magnitude more processing power? Wayne
Hughes [22] warns us of “the near impossibility of modeling the real dynamics of battle.”
Moreover, there are numerous examples of combat models being hyper-sensitive to extremely
small changes (see [13], [39], and [40]). Furthermore, even so-called high-resolution engineer-
ing models do not always predict well (see [10]). In fact, James F. O’Bryon [36], the Director
of the Department of Operational Test and Evaluation’s Live Fire Testing, writes: “Literally, not
one purely physics-based model exists in the nation to predict conventional weapons effects on
a platform.” The belief that our models cannot reliably predict outcomes is debatable for
high-resolution engineering models; however, no strong case can be made that our aggregate-
level models are reliably predictive.
Aristotle is widely attributed with saying that “it is the mark of an educated mind to rest
satisfied with the degree of precision which the nature of the subject admits and not to seek
exactness where only an approximation is possible.” This raises the question: What degree of
precision does our subject permit? With all of our uncertain and, frankly, unknowable input data
and combat processes, does it make sense to try and get as much detail as possible into models
that cannot be validated? The advice above, on how models should be used, says that the answer
depends on whether detailed modeling (e.g., modeling all of the horseshoe nails and the
elements that affect them) will help facilitate the debate or improve our ability to obtain and
communicate insights. Clearly, adding factors will potentially yield insights that could not
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possibly be gotten without them. Our contention is that adding detail may be very tempting, but
it must be balanced with our ability to understand the model, much less communicate the
findings. Understanding the model and producing persuasive results often relies on running and
examining many model cases. Lieutenant Colonel Kirk Yost [45] notes that “[m]odeling
difficulty increases exponentially and explainability goes to zero as the number of objects
increases.”
Analysts must balance the benefits associated with adding more detail to their models against
the very real costs. Hughes [22] warns us that “a large-scale computer model may . . . restrict
rather than extend thought.” Specifically, more-detailed models take longer to set up and run,
thus inhibiting our ability to investigate more situations. Moreover, detailed models may also
require an enormous amount of data. It is not unusual for studies to spend the better part of a
year getting official data for new scenarios. Even when the data come, they may be incomplete
for the detailed processes represented in the model or contain only uncertain point estimates,
likely lacking confidence measures.
Most of our community simulation models are very big. In fact, Hughes, in classroom
presentations at the Naval Postgraduate School, worries that “too many analysts . . . regard OA
[operations analysis] as the art and science of building realistic models . . . with only passing
regard for the utility and efficiency of their representations in helping decision-makers.” It
follows that we must make trade-offs in selecting the size of the models that we use in our
studies. Moreover, the amount of detail required depends on the situation, and no all-purpose
model exists.
In the Introduction, we noted the ever-increasing capabilities of computers. Even so, many of
our models take hours to run a single trial and require that many thousands of data elements be
specified. For example, the user may need to specify over 100,000 individual data elements for
some model scenarios [39]. If even a small amount of these data are uncertain, the amount of
time it takes to understand their impact by running the model is prohibitive. To fully evaluate
all of the combinations of 100 variables, each taking only two values (this would be a very small
modern combat model), takes 2100 runs, not including concerns about Monte Carlo replication.
And, as retired General Jasper Welch [44] said: “1030 [ 2100] is forever,” for 1030 is more
nanoseconds than estimates of the time since the beginning of the universe.
We still have not answered the question about how big our models should be—as no one
answer exists. From his vantage point as both an analyst and a decision-maker, Glen Kent [31]
believes that “[o]ne can easily handle four variables.” Wayne Hughes [22] cites 12 variables as
an exemplar number. Clearly, these distinguished analysts place a premium on the agility and
transparency of relatively simple models.
3. A TALE OF TWO MODELS
In this section, we introduce two very different models—Hughes’ salvo equations and
JWARS. Our purposes in comparing and contrasting these models include: (1) showing how a
relatively simple model can contribute to the decision-making process, and (2) highlighting just
how challenging building and working with large models can be. This does not mean, of course,
that one type of model is better than the other for all purposes. A qualitative comparison between
the two models is made in Section 5.
3.1. Hughes’ Salvo Model
Hughes’ salvo model (see [23]) is a “Lanchester-like” set of equations used to capture some
important dynamics of modern naval surface combat. For a missile salvo exchange between two
forces (A and B), the base homogeneous form of the model is










A  number of units (fractional) in force A put out of action from B’s salvo,
B  number of units (fractional) in force B put out of action from A’s salvo,
A  number of units in force A,
B  number of units in force B,
  number of well-aimed missiles fired per salvo by each unit of force A,
  number of well-aimed missiles fired per salvo by each unit of force B,
a1  number of hits a force A unit can take before being put out of action,
b1  number of hits a force B unit can take before being put out of action,
a3  number of well-aimed missiles a unit of force A can defend each salvo,
b3  number of well-aimed missiles a unit of force B can defend each salvo.
These equations model the number of missiles that a side absorbs in a salvo as the difference
between the aggregate number of well-aimed missiles that the other side can fire and the
defender can counter (if positive, zero otherwise). Given the number of hits that a side takes, the
number of ships lost equals the number of hits received divided by the number of hits required
to put a ship out of action. This simple, ten-variable model leaves out many factors that might
be important in any given surface engagement, such as—to name only a few of many—how the
ocean’s surface, the position of the sun, cloud formations, and operator alertness may affect the
range at which an incoming sea-skimming missile is detected and engaged. Yet, the basic salvo
equations, and some slightly more complicated variants of it, have been effectively used to
generate transparent arguments on a breadth of important issues. At the tactical level, Hughes’
salvo equations have been used to demonstrate the importance in surface combat of “attacking
effectively first” [21]. With regard to force modernization and ship design, the equations have
been used to persuasively argue that the lack of staying power of modern surface combatants,
relative to offensive and defensive capabilities, can leave otherwise vastly superior forces in
highly unstable situations [23]. As with Lanchester equations, Hughes’ salvo equations have
been used to clearly illustrate the importance of numerical superiority in modern surface combat.
In fact, they have been front-and-center in a force structure debate about the mix of combatants
the Navy should have in the future (see [8] and [24]).
A great strength of the salvo equations is their transparency. Those consuming the analysis
find it easy to follow and engaging. The underlying assumptions are clear and the associated
limitations understandable. The importance of this was brought home to the one of the authors
in his class on Combat Modeling at the Naval Postgraduate School. In the class, student-officers
(ranging from O-2 to O-5) read papers from the literature on a breadth of subjects and present
a synopsis to the rest of the class. The papers range from detailed technical studies, based on
massive computer simulations, to methodological think pieces. One of the papers the students
read is a piece by Wayne Hughes on modern surface warfare, featuring the salvo equations. In
almost every section, this paper engages the students like no other, generating, by far, the
liveliest interaction/debate. To those being briefed, the model is anything but a black box.
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Rather, it is a transparent vehicle in which arguments can be made and the consequences of
assumptions assessed. We might learn something from this—as our future senior officers will
come from men and women much like those in the class.
3.2. Joint Warfighting System
The Joint Warfighting System (JWARS) will be used to illustrate the strengths and weak-
nesses of large many-on-many simulations of combat. JWARS is:
[A] state-of-the-art constructive simulation that provides a multi-sided and balanced
representation of joint theater warfare . . . . JWARS shall assist implementation of
Joint Vision 2010 by providing a vehicle to assess current and future military
capabilities . . . . The potential users of JWARS include the Joint Staff, Services,
CINCs, OSD, Joint Task Force (JTF) Commanders/Staff, selected other DoD orga-
nizations and industry. Key applications for the use of JWARS include: Planning
[deliberate and crisis] and Execution, Force Assessment, System Effectiveness and
Trade-off Analysis, and Concept and Doctrine Development and Assessment [28].
JWARS puts special emphasis on modeling C4ISR processes. At the time this paper was being
revised (summer 2002), a beta version of the initial operating capability was undergoing testing.
JWARS has been under development since 1995, when a review team for the Secretary of
Defense concluded that “existing simulations [of joint theater warfare] used for DoD analysis
are critically limited” [28]. In fact, of 17 functional areas (e.g., ground engagement, C3, mine
warfare, etc.), only Deployment/Sealift was deemed to be adequately modeled. Existing model
designs, analysis tools, and data handling were also judged unacceptable. These facts are
indicative of the difficulty even big models have in trying to capture the important elements of
large-scale combat.
4. INSIGHTS GLEANED FROM HUGHES’ SALVO MODEL ON THE VALUES
OF INFORMATION AND FORCE ADVANTAGE
A model is useful if a better decision is made with the information it adds
—Captain Wayne Hughes [22]
The two models used in this paper—to demonstrate the value of simple models—are an
extension of Hughes’ salvo model and a simple human-in-the-loop contest (see Section 6). One
measure of the utility of Hughes’ salvo model is reflected in the value of the masters’ theses of
students that Professor Hughes has supervised. A list of them can be found at http://www.
nps.navy.mil/orfacpag/resumePages/theses/hughesth.htm. We will focus on the master’s thesis
of author McGunnigle, who in a few months used two very simple and transparent models to
provide stimulating insights into the value of tactical information relative to increased forces.
This is an area of great interest to senior leadership, as evidenced by the C4ISR emphasis in the
JWARS program and many of the very expensive warfighting experiments (see [25] and [27]).
4.1. Stochastic Hughes’ Salvo Model
To study the effects of different levels of information on surface combat, Hughes’ salvo
model was modified. Specifically, the forces were disaggregated into individual entities, each
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with its own firepower ( or ), defensive power (a3 or b3), and staying power (a1 or b1)
variables. In this formulation, individual ships can be targeted randomly, if the user desires,
based on the level of information available to the shooters (see [33] for more details). Note:
Deterministic additions to the basic Hughes’ salvo model to account for information-related
factors, such as scouting effectiveness, have been studied (see [23]).
In this paper, we summarize only a few of the cases from [33]. For each of the cases presented
here we evaluate 120 different scenarios between like naval surface forces. That is, unless
otherwise specified, the sides are identical in terms of numbers and capabilities. Both forces
consist of homogenous ships. The 120 scenarios result from a full factorial design that varies the
number of units on each side (with levels of 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6), the defensive power (with levels
of 1, 2, and 3), the firepower (with levels of 1, 2, 3, and 4), and the staying power (with levels
of 1 and 2). For each of the 120 scenarios, our primary measures of effectiveness are the mean
fraction of the Blue force surviving and the mean fraction of the Red force killed after each of
three salvos. The estimated means are based on 1,000 replications; thus, they are extremely
precise—with standard errors guaranteed to be less than .016. Putting all of these together (i.e.,
120 scenarios, three salvos, and 1000 replications), Figures 1 and 3–6 below are each composed
of 360,000 computational experiments. This type of exploration is impossible using a simulation
with a run-time of over a few seconds, such as JWARS. In fact, to run 360,000 replications of
the required 120-day war in JWARS, with the 1000-to-1 real-time to simulation-time ratio that
is required, will take about 118 processing years.
Figure 1 displays the results of the base cases—120 different scenarios, for each of three
salvos, with identical forces on each side. In all of these cases, each side randomly targets the
other force’s ships. That is, they know the general vicinity of the other force, but do not have
enough information to target individual platforms—and missiles are randomly assigned (with
equal probability) to ships. Each point on the graph represents the mean fraction of the Blue
force surviving and the mean fraction of the Red force killed. There is one point for each of the
three salvos in the 120 scenarios. All of the points that land on the line sloping downward from
(0,1) to (1,0) represent equal losses to each side. Better outcomes for Blue lie above this line,
with more (along the abscissa and the ordinate) being better for Blue. The best outcome for Blue
is at the point (1,1); that is, all of Blue’s forces survive and all of Red’s are killed. Since both
sides are equal, in all cases, the points fall along the line of equal outcomes, plus or minus some
small stochastic deviation. The outcomes across the scenarios range from near mutual destruc-
tion [i.e., close to (0,1)] to both sides suffering minimal damage [near (1,0)].
The dominate variables, in terms of determining where on the line in Figure 1 the average
outcome falls, are the number of well-aimed missiles a unit can fire ( and ) and the number
of well-aimed missiles a unit can defend (a3 and b3). Since we are dealing with equivalent
forces,    and a3  b3. The difference between the firepower  (or ) and defensive power
a3 (or b3) determines the average number of missiles that impact their target, per ship, in this
simple model. As this difference increases, the average outcome tends to move toward the point
(0,1) in Figure 1—i.e., all ships are put out of action. Conversely, as the difference becomes
increasingly negative, very little damage is sustained and the outcomes lie closer to (1,0). As the
ships’ staying power (a1 and b1) increases, the combatants are able to take more hits before
being put out of action. Therefore, as staying power increases the outcomes tend to move
towards (1,0). Note: In the model, a ships’ remaining capability is directly proportional to the
number of additional hits required to put it out of action divided by the staying power. Of course,
since damage is cumulative, as the number of salvos increases there are fewer remaining
combatants. The distribution of points, in Figure 1, is not affected much by the number of ships.
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Each of the 360 points in Figure 1 are the mean fraction of Blue survivors and mean
fraction of Red killed from 1000 Monte Carlo trials. In some cases the empirical outcomes
are widely dispersed around the means. In particular, the variability is the greatest when the
firepower is close to or equal to the defensive power. Figure 2 illustrates such a situation
after the second salvo. Here, there are four ships in each force, each of which has a
firepower of three, a defensive power of two, and a staying power of two. Since each force
contains four combatants, the fractions of the forces killed (or surviving) after a salvo must
be a member of the set {0, 1/8, 2/8, . . . , 7/8, 1}. This follows from our modeling
assumption that each ship is fully effective if it has not been hit, has half its capabilities (i.e.,
is half-killed) if it has taken one hit, and has been put out of action if it has suffered two
or more hits. The numbers in the graph are the amount of times the various outcomes are
realized. Most of the likely outcomes are close to the overall means (with about 40% of each
force remaining). However, simply as a result of chance, both forces may have between 0%
and 75% of their force remaining. There is also a positive correlation (r  .31) between the
fraction of Blue surviving and the fraction of Red killed. That is, one force’s good fortune
often comes at the other’s expense.
Figure 3 contrasts the advantage Blue gets by having another combatant in each of the 120
scenarios with the base case. As can be seen, there is a substantial and consistent advantage for
Blue in having even a one-ship numerical advantage. This is consistent with what the deter-
ministic Hughes’ salvo model found [23]. The advantage to Blue of having an extra ship is most
Figure 1. The fraction of Blue forces surviving and Red forces killed for three different salvos in 120
scenarios involving symmetric forces. The equal-outcome results span the spectrum from near total
annihilation to both sides being unscathed.
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pronounced when the forces are small and the firepower is close to the defensive power. That
is, the points close to (1,1) come from these cases. This follows because the cases in which there
is parity between striking and defensive power are sensitive to small changes in either variable.
When starting with two ships, an extra ship results in a 50% increase in aggregate firepower and
defensive power. The increase in aggregate firepower and defensive power is only about 17%
when an extra ship is added to a force of six platforms. The advantage in numbers compounds
as the number of salvos increases.
The next three figures show the benefits Blue gets with various forms of information
advantage. Figure 4 shows that in general Blue does decisively better if they can individually
target Red units and know the defensive capability and staying power of each Red unit. Note:
It is assumed that there is no error associated with Blue’s information. This unrealistic case
might be considered an optimistic bound on the value of the information in these scenarios. In
all of these cases, a seemingly reasonable doctrine by Blue is used to allocate his missiles against
Red. Specifically, Blue allocates just enough missiles to sink as many Red ships as possible each
salvo—with the ships to be sunk randomly selected. Any remaining missiles are randomly
assigned to untargeted ships.
Across the whole of the scenarios in Figure 4, Blue does better with this information. In
particular, the efficient use of weapons allows Blue to dramatically increase its lethality. For
example, when the firepower is greater than or equal to the defensive power and staying power,
Figure 2. The distribution from 1000 Monte Carlo simulations of the fraction of the Blue force
surviving and the fraction of the Red force killed after the second salvo. In this illustrative case, the
equal forces consist of four ships, each with a firepower of three, a defensive power of two, and a
staying power of two.
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Blue puts Red out of action in one salvo. However, in cases where firepower is greater than
defensive power, Red, on the first salvo, still causes great damage to Blue. More interestingly,
there are a few cases in which Blue actually does worse than Red despite the information
advantage. These cases come about when the firepower is one greater than the defensive power,
the staying power for each unit is two, and there are a small number of ships. In these situations,
Red’s random distribution of its missiles to the Blue units results in most or all of the Blue units
being damaged. The Blue decision to put specific Red units out of action leaves a portion of the
Red force undamaged. Given the modeling assumptions, a larger group of damaged units can be
less effective than a smaller group of undamaged units. This suggests that the seemingly
reasonable weapon assignment doctrine may fail in these situations.
Two other cases were also examined. In each, the sides allocate their weapons randomly, with
equal probability, to the opposing force units. Figure 5 shows the advantage Blue obtains by
firing an unopposed (but defended) first salvo. In subsequent salvos both sides use their
weapons. In this situation, Blue dominates—illustrating Wayne Hughes’ admonition that in
surface warfare you want to “attack effectively first” [21]. In cases where the firepower is greater
than the defensive power, Blue decimates Red before it has a chance to respond. In addition,
even when Red suffers only moderate damage from Blue’s first salvo, Blue has a numerical
advantage for further salvos—the effect of which we saw in Figure 3. The situations in which
Blue does not win decisively are those in which the defensive power is greater than the
firepower—that is, the points near (1,0).
Figure 3. A numerical advantage of one unit in each of the 120 cases gives Blue a consistent advantage
over Red.
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Figure 6 shows what happens when Red is aware of, and can thus target, only half of Blue’s
units on the first salvo. In this case, the effect of Blue’s advantage over Red concerning initial
position information is highly uncertain. It turns out that, given the firing doctrine, in some
situations, the unintended consequence of Red concentrating its fire on only half of Blue’s units
results in an advantage to Red. The cases where Red does better correspond to situations with
low firepower and high defensive power and staying power. In these cases, it is advantageous
to focus the fires on only a subset of the opponents units. In the opposite situation (i.e., firepower
is greater than defensive power), Blue wins decisively by distributing its weapons across the Red
force while Red wastes many weapons overkilling Blue ships.
Looking across the breadth of almost two million computational experiments, and other cases
from [33], we see that the salvo equations suggest that information in a naval surface engage-
ment usually enhances—but, if not used advantageously, may even slightly degrade—combat
effectiveness, while a numerical advantage always enhances combat effectiveness. That is, the
benefits from an information advantage are highly dependent on how the information is used.
Towards that end, the runs also provide information on when certain tactics may be appropri-
ate—and when they might not. The occasional negative effect of superior information is subject
to corrective action, once the tactician understands the cause. These exploratory insights were
gleaned by looking across a variety of conditions and are not constrained by the specific details
of a handful of scenarios. This type of exploratory analysis is difficult, if not impossible, to
perform with a JWARS-size model.
Figure 4. As a whole, an information advantage leads to better outcomes for Blue. However, there are
a handful of cases where the information, applied with the default doctrine, actually hurts Blue.
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5. COMPARING HUGHES’ SALVO EQUATIONS AND JWARS WITH
RESPECT TO JWARS’ KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
The most successful procedure for model building has been to work from simple
and small to the larger and more complex—Clint Ancker [1]
The previous section illustrated how a simple model can quickly generate stimulating
insights. We now compare Hughes’ salvo equations, with JWARS—a model that has taken the
better part of a decade to develop. Hughes’ simple salvo model and the complex JWARS system
are built for different purposes. Moreover, JWARS has yet to reach its initial operating
capability. Therefore, it is not feasible to make direct quantitative comparisons between the two
models. Nonetheless, it is worth making (mostly) qualitative comparisons between Hughes’
equations and JWARS with respect to some of JWARS’ key performance parameters. We will
focus on the three performance categories highlighted by the JWARS program: traceability,
verification and validation, and utility [29].
5.1. Traceability
The JWARS office defines traceability as being able to understand cause-and-effect relation-
ships and to track data sources. Understanding cause-and-effect relationships is what models
like the salvo equations do best. Moreover, with only ten variables, it is easy, in a two-level
Figure 5. When only Blue fires on the first salvo, it wins decisively.
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design, to obtain estimates of all 45 first-order interactions (i.e., interactions between two
factors), and even all 120 second-order interactions (interactions among three factors). Insights
in defense analysis often come from surprising interactions. With JWARS, an analyst has to
worry about thousands of factors. Thus, it will be almost impossible to be certain that there are
not unknown factors (sometimes called lurking variables) influencing outcomes. Moreover, due
to the size of the model and the scenario run-time, it will be infeasible to examine even a modest
portion of the potentially interesting first-order interactions. As for data sources, most any
analyst can get his or her hands on reasonable numbers for Hughes’ salvo model. More
importantly, analysts can easily communicate their assumptions to the decision-maker, who can
assess how much credibility to give them. For JWARS, with data coming from up to 43 different
models and organizations (from [46]), it will be a Herculean challenge just ensuring that the data
used are reasonable. That is, it will be difficult to guarantee that there are no typos in the input
data files, and that all of the numbers supplied by the different organizations are consistent with
each other. It will be impossible for a decision-maker to understand more than a small fraction
of the data. Furthermore, much of the data will invariably be highly uncertain, if not outright
unknown, for example, a threat’s breaking point.
5.2. Verification and Validation
The JWARS office defines verification and validation as having the “correct representation of
doctrine, system and unit performance, and the environment,” as well as having “balance across
Figure 6. When Red sees only half of the Blue force during the first salvo, given the default doctrine,
the outcomes are mixed.
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the warfare functions” [29]. The salvo model is, of course, applicable to only one warfare
area—naval surface warfare—and thus fails the “across warfare areas” requirement. It is
difficult, at least for the authors, to define what the “correct representation” is for aggregated unit
performance at the theater-level. Moreover, due to a lack of data, it will not be possible to
“validate” JWARS with respect to determining how “accurate [a] representation of the real-
world from the perspective of the intended uses” the model is, as validation is defined by the
Department of Defense [11]. Verification of such a large model, and the accompanying data,
will also be a challenge. The salvo model is easy to verify, thanks to its simplicity. In regards
to validation, there have been enough antiship missile attacks and ships hit that many of the
factors can be estimated (e.g., averaged) using real-world data.
5.3. Utility
The model tail sometimes seems to wag the analysis dog—Vernon Bettencourt [3]
In the JWARS operational requirements document, specific capabilities relating to the
model’s utility are the breadth of studies that can be executed, having both a deterministic and
stochastic mode, facilitating multiple levels of resolution, and execution speed. In addition to the
raw execution speed of the model, we recognize that various other measures should be included
to capture a model’s utility, including: the learning curve required to be proficient with the
model, the support team requirements, the amount of data required to run the model, and the
number of sources of official data that analysts rely upon. Below, we briefly assess the
capabilities of Hughes’ salvo model and JWARS with respect to these measures.
Certainly, Hughes’ salvo equations can address nowhere near the breadth of issues that
JWARS potentially will be able to analyze. Nonetheless, it has proved to be useful in a diverse
set of surface warfare issues, having been used to examine tactics, ship design issues, and Navy
force structure. JWARS will likely be able to address issues from the individual services as well
as the joint community. Topics are likely to include everything from the warfighting contribu-
tion of force elements to the constraints of logistics.
The basic salvo model is deterministic, though a stochastic extension was discussed above
(see [33] for more details). The stochastic extension also disaggregates the forces into individual
units, thus giving analysts at least two levels of resolution with Hughes’ model and its variants.
As this paper is being written, JWARS is a stochastic model. It is uncertain as to the degree of
flexibility with regard to resolution that JWARS will eventually be able to achieve.
Execution speed is critical to decision-makers. In a crisis, a late answer is worthless.
Furthermore, as we have already noted, the ability to examine as wide a variety of cases as
possible has many merits. Execution speed is another area in which Hughes’ salvo model excels.
The model itself takes only fractions of a second to run. JWARS is designed to be easier to use
and more responsive than the existing models (e.g., TACWAR [26]) that it will replace. The
run-time requirement for JWARS is that it will be able to simulate a 120-day war in about 3
hours. Thus, obtaining the nominal 30 stochastic replications for one input setting, on a single
processor, may take 3 days. Clearly, this inhibits exploration of JWARS’ thousands of input
values.
Beyond the execution speed of the model, we now turn to the additional metrics for Utility
that we specified above. A good analyst, with experience using Hughes’ salvo model, can get
the requisite data and look at thousands of cases in only a few hours. Moreover, only a few days
are needed to gain confidence in using and understanding the model. As for JWARS, models of
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this type are traditionally challenging to work with. Bart Bennett [2] estimates that there is a 6-
to 12-month learning curve associated with some of the large community models. Moreover, in
current practice, it is not unusual for several member teams to need as much as 6 months to build
and get the data for new scenarios. From [28], for JWARS, “at each release an [experienced]
analyst . . . shall attain an initial productivity level with 2 weeks of training, and a full capability
level with an additional 6 months of sustained, in-house hands-on experience.” For force
assessment studies, four- to six-man teams are required to complete an analysis in “no more than
a 3-month period for studies/assessments (exclusive of data collection and validation).” As
noted earlier, JWARS may require up to 43 different organizations and models to supply it data.
This will hinder analysts’ ability to support quick-reaction analyses involving new scenarios. In
fact, the authors are extremely dubious that it will be possible, as required for crisis action
planning, to prepare, execute, and analyze a scenario in “no more than four days when no
database exists.”
The question for analysts and decision-makers is: Are the time and complexity costs of
JWARS, or equivalent models, worth the added detail? Again, the answer is, it depends. More
importantly, for an organization big enough to maintain, run, and understand JWARS, this does
not need to be a one-or-the-other situation. There is no reason that an analysis organization that
can support JWARS cannot also have a suite of models like Hughes’ salvo equations as part of
its analysis toolkit.
6. INSIGHTS ON THE VALUE OF INFORMATION FROM
THE SIMPLE CONTEST
While the salvo model (see Sections 3 and 4) is pretty simple, an even simpler model—the
simple contest—also provides interesting insights into how military officers and Department of
Defense analysts use information and perceive the value of information (see [33] and [34] for
more details on these experiments).
6.1. Simple Contest Description
In the simple contest, there are two sides and ten positions. The objective of the contest is to
control the majority of the positions. Each side, Blue and Red, is given 10 units. Each unit has
a number assigned to it, indicating the strength of the unit. In the base contest, each side gets
units of strength 1–10 that they can place in any of the positions. Each position must be
defended; i.e., one unit must be placed in each position. In the base case, neither side knows how
the other’s units are assigned before the contest is determined. After the final assignment of each
side’s units, the values are revealed, and the side whose unit has the higher strength wins the
position. If both sides have the same value at a position, a fair coin is tossed to determine the
winner. After all 10 positions are evaluated, the side controlling the most positions wins the
contest. If each side holds five positions, the contest is a tie. The simple contest is related to the
card game known as War, perhaps the simplest of all card games. It is also a cousin of the
Colonel Blotto games (see [37]).
A force advantage is given to a side by adding a number to each of the side’s original unit
strengths. For example, a force advantage of 1 gives a player units with strengths of 2–11. This
increases the total force count from 55 to 65, an increase of 18%. An information advantage is
given to a side by revealing one or more of the opponent’s position assignments before the game
is evaluated. This allows the player with the information advantage to advantageously assign his
units to positions based on the information. For example, an information advantage of three
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reveals the opponent’s assignment to three positions. In all cases, the information is known to
be correct.
The side with the information advantage, assuming that the information is accurate, can make
an optimal assignment of the units. The optimal strategy is to assign a unit to the revealed
position with strength exactly 1 greater than the opponent’s unit, except for the case when the
position revealed has a 10 assigned to it. In this case, the optimal decision is to assign the unit
with strength 1 to that position. If no information advantage is given, the assignment of units to
positions has no effect on the probability of winning.
Six cases with varying levels of information and force advantage were simulated to measure
how advantages in force and information influence the chances of winning with optimal
decision-making. Case 1 is the base case, with equivalent forces on each side and no information
or force advantage. Cases 2–4 examine what happens when Blue has increasing amounts of
information by revealing the Red force’s unit strengths at one, two, and three positions,
respectively. Cases 5 and 6 give the Blue side force advantages of 1 and 2, respectively. For each
case, the probability that the Blue side wins, using an optimal strategy, is estimated by 100,000
trials of the simulation.
6.2. The Human Experiments
To address how military decision-makers use and perceive information in the simple contest,
the same six cases were run with human subjects (Blue) playing against the computer (Red). The
subjects were 30 military decision-makers, including Naval officers, Marine Corps officers, and
Department of the Navy analysts. The subjects had at least a college degree, with the military
subjects ranging in rank from Navy lieutenant to Navy captain. Each subject was read the
description of the contest and then given five practice trials. During the practice trials, the
subjects were allowed to ask questions about how to use the program. The subjects were then
given five trials for each of the six cases. The order in which each trial of each case was
presented to the subject was randomized, but known to the subject. The subjects had an
unlimited amount of time to finish each trial. For each trial, the subjects could reassign their
units as desired and then evaluate the trial. After each trial, they could see the result as a win,
tie, or loss. The trial outcomes were recorded as win or not win.
After the subjects completed the 30 trials, with feedback, they were asked two questions:
● Question One: Does information revealing the opponent’s first position give a
better chance, the same chance, or a worse chance of winning the simple contest
than a force advantage of 1 that gives your side units with strengths of 2–11?
● Question Two: Does information revealing the opponent’s first and second posi-
tions give a better chance, the same chance, or a worse chance of winning the simple
contest than a force advantage of 1 that gives your side units with strengths of 2–11?
6.3. Experimental Results
The results of the simulation and human experiments are displayed in Table 1. The proba-
bilities of Blue winning, based on 150 trials (30 subjects with five replications per subject) for
each of the six cases of the human experiments, are displayed in column five of Table 1. Column
four displays the probabilities that would be obtained with optimal decision-making, as gener-
ated by the simulation. The results of the simple controlled human experiments show the extent
to which force advantage and information advantage enhance the chance of winning the contest
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for military decision-makers. The subjects’ answers to questions one and two on their percep-
tions of the values of information vis-à-vis force advantage are displayed in Table 2.
The rows of Table 1, from Case 1 to Case 4, show the benefits of increasing the information
that the Blue “commander” has on the Red forces. As expected, the probability of winning
increases as the subjects are given more information. However, in Cases 2 and 4, even in this
simple, stress-free environment, the subjects as a whole did not use the information optimally.
While Case 3 is not statistically significant, the P-value (less than .15) is suggestive that here
too the subjects were suboptimal—however, a larger sample is needed to definitely resolve this.
Note: We use one-sided tests when comparing the subjects’ performance against the optimal
strategy for the cases with an information advantage (Cases 2, 3, and 4). In these cases, since
the optimal strategy is known, the hypothesis tests are assessing whether the human decision-
makers are making optimal decisions (the null hypothesis) or are making suboptimal decisions
(the one-sided alternative). For the cases where no information advantage was given (Cases 1,
5, and 6), the strategies by the subjects have no effect on the probability of winning—this was
not communicated to the test subjects. The two-sided tests check whether the winning propor-
tions are the same (the null hypothesis) or different (the alternative hypothesis).
Across the various levels of force advantage and information advantage, a clear ordering is
possible. A force advantage of one is preferred to an information advantage of 1, and is about
equal to an information advantage of 2. An information advantage of 3 is preferred to a force
advantage of 1. But, a force advantage of 2 is preferred to an information advantage of 3. This
ordering applies to both the experiments and the simulations. Yet, the subjects overestimated the
value of information vis-à-vis force advantage—even after completing five trials with feedback
for each of the six cases. The most striking result is that 22 of 30 subjects did not prefer a force














Case 1 None None .2936 .3067 .7281**
Case 2 One None .4742 .3867 .0139*
Case 3 Two None .6808 .6400 .1491*
Case 4 Three None .8602 .7767 .0034*
Case 5 None One .6874 .6800 .8461**
Case 6 None Two .9239 .9067 .4692**
a The winning proportion increases with an information or force advantage. The P-values with a * cor-
respond to one-sided hypothesis tests, while P-values with a ** correspond to two-sided hypothesis tests.
The P-values are calculated assuming that the trials are independent and identically distributed. In reality,
there are differences between the probabilities of winning for the different subjects, and there is likely some
correlation within a subject’s trails.
Table 2. Summary of survey results.a
Better chance Same chance Worse chance
Question One 13 9 8
Question Two 26 3 1
a For Question One, the subjects that answered a “Better Chance” and the “Same
Chance” (22 out of 30) overvalued the information advantage vis-à-vis force advan-
tage. For Question Two, the subjects that answered a “Better Chance” (26 out of 30)
also overvalued the information.
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advantage of 1 to an information advantage of 1, even though the force advantage of 1
outperformed the information advantage of 1 by .6800 to .3867 in the empirical tests.
These results show that military decision-makers, as with humans in many other situations,
often do not use information optimally (see, e.g., [14], [17], [41], and [42]). Moreover,
considering the experiment’s elegant simplicity, this suggests that military decision-makers in
real situations may sometimes overvalue the benefits of information. Alternatively, another
explanation for the subjects’ inability to judge the value of information in the simple contest
exists. While the pattern in Table 1 is clear, the participants did not get to see the table. The
game players only observed five games for each of the six cases. With only five observations,
even strong patterns can be hard to detect. For instance, the standard deviation on the observed
proportion of wins for five games, with a true probability of winning of .3, as in Case 1, is
slightly more than .2. Therefore, the results in Table 2 might reasonably reflect the subjects’
prior beliefs on the relative advantages of information and force. The fact that these are wrong
illustrates the danger in trying to draw conclusions without much data—as is often the situation
with complicated models, such as JWARS, where the complexity and long run times usually
limit the number of simulation trials.
With sparse data, it is all too easy to find false explanations that fit the data. As Efron and
Tibshirani [15] write: “Most people are not natural-born statisticians. Left to our own devices
we are not very good at picking out patterns from a sea of noisy data. To put it another way, we
are all too good at picking out non-existent patterns that happen to suit our purposes.” In order
for data to speak clearly, we need lots of it. Simple models facilitate obtaining the amounts of
data necessary for clear patterns to emerge.
The simple contest experiments were designed, implemented, and analyzed by one person
(author McGunnigle) in only a few weeks. Since the sample size, 30 humans, is reasonably
large, and the experiment is controlled, these simple experiments are a nice compliment to the
limitations (e.g., overly complex, confounding factors, small number of events, expensive, long
duration, etc.) of in-the-field warfighting experiments and wargames that DoD has been
conducting.
7. CONCLUSION
The experts tell us that we should judge the utility of a military model by how well it helps
us make good decisions. It follows that different types of models are appropriate for different
purposes. For any given study, in selecting the tools to use, analysts must weigh several
competing attributes, such as the models’ ease of use, agility, transparency, reproducibility, and
realism. Towards that end, Paul Davis et al. [9] recommend that “the DoD should . . . ensure
development of analytic architectures, supported by model and simulation families, to permit
gaming and analysis at many levels of resolution and from many perspectives.” See [9] and [32]
for examples of how to design experiments involving multiple diverse analytic tools.
Al Brandstein [5] succinctly sums up the potential benefits that can be obtained by synthe-
sizing results from multiple analysis tools with his Theorem of Hope. After reviewing the
analytic strengths and weaknesses of equations, war games, simulations, and distillations, he
concludes that the intersection of the weaknesses is empty, and the union of the strengths fills
the space. Thus, there is hope that analysts can better assist decision-makers. The real question
is: How do we synthesize the multiple analysis tools? The authors believe that we need to follow
the advice of the giants and increase our use of simple models. Clayton Thomas used to preach
about how useful simple models, real data, and a scientific outlook were during the early days
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of Operations Research in World War II [43]. Perhaps we will advance the most if we are
mindful of our past.
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